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BEGINNING WITH PROPERTY? HEGEL AND 
UNFOLDING FREEDOM IN A SOUTH AFRICAN 
ACADEMIC CONTEXT
Academic freedom is one of the most needed of all rights for a university to fulfil its mission to educate 
and uplift its students and, by extension, the society in which it lives. However, the question of what 
this freedom is and what it entails constantly unfolds as universities evaluate, critique, and educate 
society and this is at present under the microscope in the context of the #feesmustfall campaign 
and other the student protests over social transformation. In the article I critique Hegel’s concept of 
freedom, often considered one of the cornerstones to the philosophical foundation of Western society’s 
concept of freedom, which was also employed within a South African context. From this, it is possible 
to gain a sense that this freedom entails a mutual recognition of the other and a responsibility to 
restrain one’s own determination (or will-to-power) in order to ensure that the other does the same. 
Hegel reaches a stage where individuals mutually relinquish certain freedoms (like the freedom to kill 
or enslave another), and thus they create a space of mutual recognition where each sees the other as an 
individual self. This concept of freedom allows the university to remain solely on its own in the name 
of its academic freedom. The state recognizes this freedom as long as this relationship is mutually 
beneficial. The interference in the university’s right to self-determination is indicative of a much larger 
issue.  Although Hegelian freedom enjoins a respect between individuals within society, it can also be 
used to separate society; the ‘we’ disintegrates in light of so-called ‘respect’ when one wants to exert 
their right to autonomy at the expense of others. What I attempted to carve out is a critique of Hegelian 
freedom and its underpinning of the basic concept of freedom for both the Western and South African 
societies. By adding four more pillars to the Hegelian three – democracy, equality, reconciliation and 
diversity – South Africa has already begun to see that the issue could resolve itself with beginning to 
understand itself through more responsibility, respect, freedom and so forth.
KEYWORDS: academic freedom, #feesmustfall campaign, Hegel’s concept of freedom, respect, the state
Akademiese vryheid is een van die noodsaaklikste van al die regte wat ‘n universiteit nodig het om sy 
missie te vervul om sy studente op te hef en deur ‘n uitbreiding hiervan die gemeenskap waarin hulle 
hulle bevind ook op te hef. Die vraag is nou wat hierdie vryheid behels soos wat universiteite evalueer, 
kritiseer en opvoeding bied aan die samelewing.  Dit is tans onder die loep binne die konteks van die 
#feesmustfall veldtog en ook ander studente-proteste oor sosiale transformasie.  In hierdie artikel 
ondersoek ek die konsep van vryheid soos deur Hegel gekonseptualiseer, aangesien dit dikwels gesien 
word as een van die hoekstene van die filosofiese fondamente van die Westerse opvatting van vryheid, 
wat ook binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks toepassing vind. Hieruit is dit moontlik om ‘n wederkerige 
erkenning van die ander kry, en dit behels ‘n verantwoordelikheid om mens se eie wilsdeterminasie 
te beperk om sodoende seker te maak dat die ander dieselfde sal doen. Hegel bereik ‘n stadium waar 
individue gelyktydig sekere vryhede afstaan (soos die vryheid om ‘n ander in slawerny te neem of 
dood te maak) en dus skep hulle ‘n ruimte van wederkerige erkenning en sien mekaar as ‘n individuele 
self. Hierdie opvatting van vryheid laat die universiteit toe om op sy eie te bly staan in die naam van 
akademiese vryheid, en die staat laat dit toe solank hierdie Vryheid wedersyds tot voordeel strek.  Die 
inmenging in die universiteite se reg tot self-determinasie is ‘n aanduiding van ‘n veel groter probleem. 
Hoewel Hegeliaanse vryheid poog om respek af te dwing tussen individue binne die samelewing 
kan dit ook gebruik word om die samelewing te versplinter sodat die “ons” disintegreer in die lig van 
sogenaamde “respek” as die een party sy reg tot outonomie wil afdwing tot nadeel van ander. Wat ek 
probeer uitwys het is ‘n kritiese beskouing van Hegel se konsep van vryheid en die onderliggendheid 
daarvan aan die basiese konsep van Vryheid vir beide die Suid-Afrikaanse en Westerse samelewings. 
Deur vier meer pilare toe te voeg tot die Hegeliaanse drie – demokrasie, gelykheid, versoening en 
diversiteit – het Suid-Afrika reeds begin sien dat begrip kan manifesteer deur verantwoordelikheid, 
respek, vryheid ensovoorts.
SLEUTELWOORDE: akademiese vryheid, #feesmustfall veldtog, Hegel se konsep van vryheid, respek, 
die staat
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1. INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom is one of the most needed of all rights for a 
university to fulfil its mission to educate and uplift its students 
and, by extension, the society in which it lives. However, the 
question of what this freedom is and what it entails constantly 
unfolds as universities evaluate, critique, and educate society. 
Naturally, this becomes a tense relationship as academics 
attempt to push society while, in turn, the broader society 
attempts to keep the university grounded in the present 
concerns and questions that its individuals face daily. If 
academics stray too far from these problems, disregarding 
them in the name of an ersatz freedom to research, then they 
lose their connection to society and, hence, their mission. 
Correspondingly, when society begins to disregard the work 
of academics in the name of an ersatz freedom from elitism, 
they cease any real progress of addressing their individual 
and collective concerns. In this way, academic freedom does 
not entail autonomy; rather, it entails a mutual responsibility. 
In the current academic climate, South African universities 
are grappling with the question of freedom after 2015’s 
#feesmustfall campaign and other the student protests over 
social transformation – some of which have become violent as 
could be seen with the burning of campus buildings and other 
property at North-West University’s Mafikeng Campus and at 
the University of Cape Town, to name just two examples. More 
pointedly, the issues surrounding the teaching and publishing 
languages within the university system directly concern the 
question of academic freedom: does the university adhere to 
the protests of (mostly black and under-privileged) students 
who do not want their universities teaching in Afrikaans or do 
they, in the name of academic freedom, resist this demand? 
The split between Belgium’s KU Leuven, my alma mater, 
and Louvain La-Neuve is a profound example of how 
academic autonomy, rather than freedom, can have negative 
consequences for both parties. The University of Louvain, 
established in 1425, flourished throughout its early and mid-life 
as one of Europe’s premier universities. Within the mid-20th 
century, when Belgium’s linguistic-cultural divide began to 
sharpen with northern Flanders speaking Flemish-Dutch and 
southern Wallonia speaking French, the university was in crisis. 
As both regions began to further culturally separate themselves 
by language, Louvain, which is in the Flemish region, staunchly 
remained a French-speaking university. They published in 
French and taught in French. This relationship between the 
university and Flemish culture eventually deteriorated in the 
1960s when students protested over their university’s devotion 
to French education. By 1969, the university had officially 
become Flemish-speaking, renamed as Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. Outraged, several French-speaking professors left 
and founded what is now known as Louvain La-Neuve. In so 
doing, they took half of the university’s books, with some series 
running A-M at Leuven and N-Z at Louvain La-Neuve, amongst 
other resources. Even though relations have softened today, 
this separation remains intact and what little cooperation 
there is between them is fraught with politics. Interestingly, 
KU Leuven’s desire to internationalize eventually resulted in 
it embracing English as the primary publishing and teaching 
language. During my studies, I was even dissuaded from 
studying Flemish, encouraged to learn German instead and, 
ironically, French. Louvain La-Neuve, being firmly situated 
within francophone academia, still remains steadfastly French. 
Even though both universities are well regarded institutions, 
one has to wonder what opportunities were lost in the 
duplication of libraries, professorships, staff, buildings, and so 
on. Furthermore, and most importantly, Louvain’s professors 
failed to challenge society and to find resolutions to the growing 
divide between Flanders and Wallonia; a divide that, while 
peaceful, still exists today. Through a desire to have autonomy, 
to remain French while their students and country were rapidly 
changing, several academics decided to leave the conversation 
completely and to take with them valuable intellectual and 
institutional resources. Likewise, the protestors failed to 
recognize the historical-cultural situation of the university 
itself; thinking that it should immediately reflect its own 
values through language even though it had been a French 
speaking university and its francophone tradition stretched 
back over 400 years (in its earlier years, Latin was the teaching 
language). This divorce between the two was the result of a 
failure to communicate, but, more pointedly, it was a failure of 
responsibility in the name of ‘freedom’ on both sides. 
In South Africa, I see a similar situation occurring within the 
language debate and the student protests at various universities 
where each side seeks certain autonomies, entrenched by a 
collective and individual will-to-power, where the term of 
‘freedom’ is levied as a legitimizing force. However, this issue 
is not germane just to South African academia and society; one 
can see it in the so-called ‘religious freedom’ debates in the 
US, where some Christians reject the government’s new laws 
pertaining to LGBT rights and health care mandates, as well as 
in Europe where right-leaning separatists seek more and more 
autonomy from the European Union. The United Kingdom’s so-
called ‘Brexit’ referendum is the chief example of this desire for 
ersatz freedom, or, more nakedly, autonomy. The issue ahead 
of South Africa and for the world at large is whether freedom 
means collective responsibility or individual autonomy.
In what follows, I will critique Hegel’s concept of freedom, 
often considered one of the cornerstones to the philosophical 
foundation of Western society’s concept of freedom, which 
was also employed within a South African context. From 
this, we will gain a sense that this freedom entails a mutual 
recognition of the other and a responsibility to restrain one’s 
own determination (or will-to-power) in order to ensure that 
the other does the same. My primary issue with this sense of 
freedom is that it merely entails respect for the other, not the 
other’s well-being; it is an autonomous freedom and not a 
collectivist one. With property rights as its groundwork, it only 
requires that I respect the other’s self-determination, not that 
I need to work with the other or ensure the other’s welfare as 
I may wish the other to do with me. This concerns the notion 
of academic freedom since, given the current political climate, 
freedom often means a withdrawal from existing communities 
and societies – either with academics entrenching themselves 
within the university system to protect their research, teaching 
positions, and so forth from being co-opted by outside politics, 
or with the aforementioned examples of freedom employed 
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within the Brexit and religious freedom debates. Thereafter I 
argue that freedom must be unfolded or perhaps redeveloped 
to something beyond Hegel’s mere respect and recognition. The 
upshot is a possible future concept of freedom that is not based 
upon recognition and responsibility, but one on solidarity and 
obligation. However, this paper will only problematize the issue 
and cannot, due to the space and scope of the paper, immediately 
resolve the question of freedom in the South African university. 
I cannot imagine that one paper could immediately resolve 
this issue. Hopefully and however, I foresee that what follows 
may reshape the discussion of academic freedom within 
this context; questioning and spurring academics to further 
engage (rather than retreat from) the freedom debates that are 
happening in this country and in the world at large.
2. HEGELIAN FREEDOM: PROPERTY AND 
RECOGNITION
To understand what freedom is we must go back to its Western, 
modern roots in the philosophy of Hegel. However, given that 
our present concerns are an extension of Hegel’s philosophy 
and not with Hegel himself, this review will only briefly (and 
perhaps simplistically) cover his concept. It should give us 
a foothold into the question of freedom itself, basically, and 
ought to illuminate and not overshadow our conversation on 
academic freedom in South Africa. 
Hegel begins with a notion of freedom that moves from the 
abstract to the concrete through three forms: universality, 
particularity, and individuality. In the universality, one begins 
understanding oneself by consciously being aware “of itself 
to itself”; meaning that one recognizes that it exists in the 
world. But this freedom, being speculative and abstract, knows 
no limits to itself in relation to another: “(i) I am completely 
determined on every side (in my inner caprice, impulse, and 
desire, as well as my immediate external existence) yet (ii) 
nonetheless I am simply and solely self-relation, and therefore 
in finitude I know myself as infinite, universal, and free”1 
(Hegel, 2008:53-54, §35). This universality is an abstract right 
that provides the conception that one exists in the world, yet, 
knowing oneself as infinite and completely unburdened (free), 
the expanse of one’s determination flows over everything: one 
over-determines others in expressing this freedom and thus 
cannot co-exist with others or, as Hegel argues, one requires 
more in order to “be a person and respect others as persons,” 
which he finds is the basic imperative to one becoming a 
personality (Hegel, 2008:55, §36). As Charles Taylor puts 
it, “The intuition of genuine universality in man therefore 
progressively separates him from his community. It leads to a 
struggle within man and within the community as this public 
expression of the universal enters into conflict with every 
vocation to the universal which underlies it” (Taylor, 2005:172). 
Accordingly, this state of freedom must pass away in order for 
the self to enjoin its freedom to a community of others who 
wish to do the same. 
1 For the remainder of this article I will cite both the page numbers 
of this translation and the section numbers for those using other 
editions.
The antipode to the universality is the particularity, where 
one finds its personality through its immediate desires and 
impulses; whereas the universality is an indeterminate state 
of ‘everything and infinite,’ the particularity is a determinate 
state of ‘something and finite’. Hegel calls this an abstract 
right as well since it remains only concerned “with the person 
as person, and therefore with the particular … only insofar as 
it is something separable from the person and immediately 
different from him” (Hegel, 2008:59, §43). Here, the self’s 
particularity is a slave to its immediate impulses and concerns in 
contradistinction to the universality’s lack thereof. Universality 
and particularity therefore represent opposing aspects of one’s 
freedom: in the universal, one finds oneself as an existing self 
but with nothing to show for its existence since this selfhood 
is infinite and expansive, and, in the particular, one finds 
oneself as an existing self through one’s desires and impulses 
but cannot move beyond these desires to understand itself in 
relation to the whole. These are ‘negative’ forms of freedom 
since both find the self separated and hence the self denies any 
otherness so as to remain free from others (Hegel, 2008:28-
30, §5; Houlgate, 1991:75-82). Hegel has presented us with a 
dialectic of abstract freedom: on both sides the self remains 
an abstract concept, only willing to understand itself and its 
freedom in an absolutised form that either over-determines or 
under-determines itself, separating itself from others. What is 
required then, is a synthesis through the sublation (aufheben) of 
the two; forming the concept of the individuality.
Universality and particularity were abstract notions of the self’s 
personhood and its freedom. Consequently, they were also 
immediate concepts of freedom.2 Contrariwise, individuality, 
in its self-determination, passes through a mediation where it 
finds itself face-to-face with another self. In order to respect 
this other one must limit oneself by neither over-determining 
this other (through the exertion of its own will) nor being over-
determined itself by the other. In this limitation, the self still 
knows itself (universality, indeterminacy) and also knows its 
desires and impulses (particularity, determinacy) but finds a 
way to be “both of these at once” through the sublation of the 
two, creating a “concrete concept of freedom, while the two 
previous moments have been found to be through and through 
abstract and one-sided” (Hegel, 2008:33, §7). Rather than 
indeterminate or determinate, this process is best expressed as 
a self-determination in that it determines the self’s personhood 
by requiring another self. Because of this requirement, it is a 
mediated determination.
Now that Hegel has an abstract concept of the self, he is ready 
to move towards understanding how freedom becomes a 
concrete reality through individuality. In doing so, he traces 
the history of Western freedom by beginning with the master 
and slave dialectic: the master frees himself/herself from 
2 Given the scope of this article and the brief, and my somewhat overly 
simplistic reading of Hegel, we do not have time to review the question 
of immediacy and mediation within Hegel’s thinking. However, for 
clarification, see Pippin, Robert, Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire 
and Death in the Phenomenology of the Spirit (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2012) Ch. 2, “On Hegel’s Claim that ‘Self-Consciousness Finds Its 
Satisfaction only in Another Self-Consciousness.”
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the burden of labour by enslaving the other. Yet the master’s 
freedom is imperfect: since the master comes to depend on 
the slave, the master consequently fails to achieve the robust, 
concrete autonomy of self-determination (Hegel, 2008:44-57, 
§25-41). Skipping ahead in the development of concrete forms 
of freedom, Hegel reaches a stage where individuals mutually 
relinquish certain freedoms (like the freedom to kill or enslave 
another), and thus they create a space of mutual recognition 
where each sees the other as an individual self (Hegel, 2008:49-
52, §32). Here, each side’s recognition begins with a respect for 
the other’s property, hence, “from the standpoint of freedom, 
property is the first existence [Dasein] of freedom;” i.e. this is its 
first concrete existence (Hegel, 2008:61, §40). More pointedly, 
the moment that property is recognized by two individuals is 
the first moment where one’s personhood becomes more than 
an abstract notion: “the rationale of property is to be found 
not in the satisfaction of needs but in the supersession of pure 
subjectivity of personality. In his property a person exists for 
the first time as reason” (Hegel, 2008:58, §41) 3 Property is the 
first concrete understanding of freedom and this is because 
of its rationality. As Merold Westphal clarifies, this rationality 
transcends the “subjectivity of personality” since, by owning 
property, the self begins its concrete existence (i.e. the self 
is no longer an abstract concept) because property gives the 
self a tangible, physical realization of its selfhood (Westphal, 
1992:29). Property represents the self’s claim to exist in the 
world saying, as it were, ‘here I am, this is my land, and I will 
defend it either through the courts or through battle’. 
In safeguarding this respect, individuals come together 
to enact laws and declare certain inalienable rights. This 
coming together creates a ‘we,’ a society of self-determining 
individuals, living together, who all enjoy the same freedoms 
but also share responsibilities of protecting the rights of 
others. For Hegel, property is merely the first concretization 
of this mutual respect between individuals and he argues 
that all laws and rights thereafter are extensions of this initial 
respect. Thus, at the beginning of the question of freedom is a 
question of recognition, of limitation of one’s selfhood in order 
for another literally to exist in space and time. Note that this 
concretization happened before humanity historically created 
land deeds and contractual law; these are just progressions of 
this movement toward freedom: what is actually at issue here is 
the mutual recognition that ‘this is my space’ and ‘that is your 
space’ begins the quest for understanding how one becomes 
free in the world. Our eventual movement toward laws and 
rights further establishes these claims, thereby building a more 
robust concept of freedom within a society.
In summary, Hegel’s concept of freedom is entrenched into his 
idea of how one even becomes a self, how one may even claim to 
have free will. Beginning with one-sided and abstract notions 
of freedom and personhood, he argues that the self initially 
sees itself as, on the one hand, an infinitely existing thing that 
is unburdened by any limitations. On the other hand, through 
3 It is important to keep in mind that this is the ‘concept’ of property 
and Hegel is arguing that the ability to own property is the first step 
in the process of a self existing with others as a real person. He is not 
stating that only property owners are real persons.
its slavish desires and impulses, the self also sees itself as 
finitely bound to the particularities of these impulses. On both 
sides, one cannot find a true and actual sense of freedom within 
the world; both constructions are abstract and cannot deal with 
any sense of alterity or otherness (and, hence, any mediation). 
In order to find a way to deal with alterity, the self recognizes 
other selves a qualitatively the same, thereby limiting both 
sides of abstract freedom (each is aufgehoben into the other) to 
create a self-determined identity: the self’s infinitely expansive 
existence cancels out its finite and particular desires, and both 
are elevated to a sense of identity that, through a mediated 
existence with others, is able to freely express itself by not 
over-determining others nor being over-determined itself. 
The first moment of this self-limitation begins when the self 
recognizes its own property, its own place in the world, while 
also recognizing that others have this same ability. To solidify 
this recognition, these individual selves come together to enact 
laws and rights, which begins a society and the conversation 
about what else should become a law or right. 
3. AUTONOMOUS FREEDOM: THE 
PROBLEM WITH PROPERTY
Hegel conceptualizes freedom as a part of our personhood and, 
by extension, how we see others. Hegel’s concept is a sound one 
and its influence can be seen (whether intended or not) within 
the constitutions of most democratic governments. One can 
see it, for example, within the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1996), where it defines who can be recognized as 
citizens and what rights and privileges are citizens are endowed 
with: “There is a common South African citizenship [i.e. we 
recognize that we legally are bound together]. All citizens are 
(a) equally entitled to the rights and privileges of citizenship 
[i.e. we recognize that all have qualitatively the same selfhood] 
and (b) [are] equally subject to the duties and responsibilities 
of citizenship [i.e. they must recognize that others have this 
selfhood and are duty-bound to uphold it].”4 
One can also see it within the question of academic freedom: the 
university, as an institution, claims its freedom to be separate 
and individual from other institutions (explicitly, the state) by 
asserting its rights and privileges to self-governance. Thus, it 
concretizes its own self-determination by claiming these rights, 
the right to exist. Effectively, the university claims, ‘this is our 
space.’ In order to make this freedom and individuality clear, 
it drafts a charter for itself, a contract, which eventually is 
mutually recognized by its board of trustees (as well as those 
who are a part of the institution, the faculty especially) and 
the state, along with other socially important institutions. The 
university, in the interests of pursuing its goals as an institution 
(as stated in its personal charter), seeks recognition by the 
state as a free and separate institution. The state, as a product 
of the people, seeks to educate those people and notices that a 
university that is free to achieve its own interests (i.e. achieve 
its own self-determination, its own freedom) is mutually 
beneficial; even if at times the state subsidizes the university’s 
research and tuition. Therefore, the university restricts itself to 
remain within its stated charter (its self-determination) and the 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ch. 1, art. 3, sect. 1-2.
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state recognizes its independence. Academic freedom, in this 
mode, is one of mutual self-interest and autonomy that begins 
with the actualization of the institution as a self-determined 
entity with the right to exist independently that is then 
recognized by its other, which in this scenario is the state.
This concept of freedom therefore allows the university to 
remain solely on its own in the name of its academic freedom. 
The state recognizes this freedom, so as long as the university 
upholds its side of the bargain to educate the state’s citizenry 
and to have its research spur economic and social development; 
as long as this relationship is mutually beneficial, basically. 
Accordingly, when the state or other institutions begin to 
interfere in the university’s operations, academics (as part of 
the university) fight for their right to this freedom.5 This is 
often where the question of academic freedom lies for most 
people: on whether the state (or other actors) has the right to 
interfere in the university’s operations, often on the level of 
dictating what it should (or should not) research and teach to 
its students. 
The interference in the university’s right to self-determination 
is indicative of a much larger issue concerning whether 
this notion of freedom is even the most beneficial one for 
humanity as a whole. Does it enable, rather than limit, our 
more selfish desires by propagating a system that furthers our 
own autonomous will-to-power? Is this concept of freedom 
the most ‘just’ concept that we can create? On a societal level, 
the university is more than an institution that is autonomous 
from the state. As mentioned before, academics push society to 
question and re-evaluate the world in which society creates and, 
in turn, the larger society pushes academics to remain grounded 
by addressing the extant questions and concerns that they have 
of that world. Both, then, need each other for existence but not 
in a way where one recedes so that the other can be, nor in a way 
where merely recognizing the other is satisfactory. Rather, the 
issues academics investigate stem from the problems society 
itself is grappling with and, in turn, the possible solutions 
that academics find spur society onward, thereby creating 
more relevant questions. Furthermore, since academics are 
themselves a part of society and universities often exist within 
the functional apparatus of the state – as funded by the state 
– they cannot extricate themselves from the larger whole and 
hence claim true independence from it. If these statements are 
true then this relationship goes beyond mutual recognition 
and self-limitation: it becomes an issue of heteronomy and 
interdependence, not one of autonomy and individuality. Even 
though Hegel recognizes that mediation is necessary for self-
determination (there need to be other selves for one to be a true 
self, basically) his concept of freedom sidesteps the underlying 
issue of obligation by merely beginning with property rights as 
its first and, consequently, necessary embodiment. 
5 Even though ‘the state’ has been used for the university’s other 
in this explication of freedom, one could easily introduce other 
institutions into this role, or perhaps collective groups such as 
protestors who represent a certain aspect of society. The concrete way 
that universities achieve their freedom varies according to the socio-
political constructs of the society in which they exist but the general 
idea of how they achieve this freedom still fits Hegel’s concept.
Also, a side issue emerges concerning private universities that 
further challenges this model of freedom: because of their 
independence from the state they are often awarded ‘more’ 
freedom than state universities, especially when it comes to 
enrolment and curricula. The question of concrete academic 
freedom becomes fragmented and more particular as the types 
of freedom enjoyed by institutions are often dictated by their 
relation to the state and society at large. This furthers the 
need for a better understanding of freedom beyond Hegel’s 
concept: do private institutions deserve more freedom than 
state-run ones? Though their charters often declare a similar 
mission to educate and uplift society, are they less bound to 
the concerns of society? Hegel’s concept of freedom accords 
private universities greater freedom, so the respective answers 
are yes, they have more freedom than state-run institutions, 
and no, they are not bound to the concerns of society. Yet still, 
there is a glitch: many states subsidize tuition fees and research 
at private institutions and these institutions, comprising 
academics who exist within society, who still claim to uplift 
and educate that society, thereby creating a link between their 
research and teaching and society at large. They see their work 
as important to society. In both cases they represent a concept 
of freedom that exists in between sole autonomy and freedom; 
they are connected-thus-obligated but they are also separate-
thus-independent. Considering the religiously confessional 
nature of many of these private universities, their concept of 
academic freedom is further problematized by their respective 
adherence to religious doctrine and how it influences their 
curricula and student formation. All of this necessitates a need 
to better understand the concept of freedom amidst conflicting 
obligations. 
Returning to the core issue, Hegel has presented us with a 
concept of freedom that is essentially self-interested and sees 
others only as necessary functionaries employed to preserve 
this self-interest: the only reason I respect others’ property and 
abide by the laws of society is ensure that others do the same.6 
Autonomy becomes the name of the game and if all that I need 
to do is restrict some of my self-interested impulses in order to 
achieve most of my desires then this is a bargain that I can live 
with. This limitation becomes the standard by which we treat 
others and, though it is a necessary one, it is also not enough. 
As Merold Westphal points out:
6 I concede that this is a somewhat Fichtean reading of Hegel, but I think 
that this point is still a valid one. Though Hegel is trying to present us 
with a description of how freedom is realized and not what freedom 
ought to be, I find that, by describing it as beginning with property, 
he lays the foundation for every encounter with an other to be one 
of self-interest, even if one has to limit one’s self-interest in order to 
not over-determine this other. In Fear and Trembling’s teleological 
suspension of the ethical and Concluding Unscientific Postscript’s 
theory of stages culminating if a Christ-like love for the other (which 
is later elaborated upon in Works of Love) Søren Kierkegaard levies a 
similar critique against Danish Hegelianism. For more regarding this 
issue, I have covered this critique and how Merold Westphal employs 
it in how own concerns against Hegel: Sands, Justin, “Hegelians in 
Heaven … But on Earth? Westphal’s Kierkegaardian Faith,” Journal for 
the History of Modern Theology, 23(1) 2016, 1-26.
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The property I own may be far from sufficient to 
provide for my subsistence needs; and my property 
rights will not have been violated as long as I own 
something. The society that refuses to bulldoze the 
shanty town in which I live so as to respect my rights 
as a ‘homeowner’ will have done all that is required by 
Hegel’s theory of property rights, even if it provides 
me with no work or with work at wages so low that I 
cannot feed and clothe my family (Westphal, 1992:25). 
Westphal’s argument is that perhaps freedom requires more 
than the respect and separate spheres of action for individuals.7 
Going back to the Louvain scenario, these professors acted within 
their rights and freedoms, as prescribed by Hegel and within 
Belgian law, to divide their university. However, in doing so, 
they also failed their mission towards the society which created, 
sustained, and above all needed them. Although Hegelian 
freedom enjoins a respect between individuals within society, 
it can also be used to separate society; the ‘we’ disintegrates in 
light of so-called ‘respect’ when one wants to exert their right to 
autonomy from others. To be fair to Hegel, a society can build 
on to this issue of respect to provide rights that are more than 
property rights – such as the right to clean drinking water in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa or the right to an 
attorney at trial in the U.S. Constitution. This is the beginning 
for Hegel, not the end point. Yet still, by initializing the first 
moment of intersubjectivity and all concrete forms of freedom 
with a basic self-interest for recognition through possession 
and property rights, Hegelian freedom becomes foundationally 
a conceptual desire for an autonomous existence in light of a 
world populated with other selves. Though there is a duty and 
responsibility to respect other’s autonomy, this is still self-
interested: it is a contract between two selves to not attack the 
other’s possessions.
4. CONCLUSION: UNFOLDING FREEDOM
Freedom, in particular academic freedom, must demand more 
than just a respect for society. The concept of academic freedom 
unfolds through the relationship between the university and 
society, but, in order for that unfolding to occur, there must 
be a sustained engagement between them. A university’s 
mission accordingly cannot be the pursuit of autonomous 
self-determination; it is a pursuit to educate and uplift its 
students and, thus, its society. In this way, its freedom cannot 
be separated from society; it must listen to the concerns within 
society and seek resolution for those concerns. In our current 
situation, where protests are a regular occurrence, academics 
should not shut their office windows to quiet the anguish 
and cries from those outside. By further separating itself, the 
university loses its ability to speak on these issues, thereby 
ceasing to progress both society and itself. It dies a slow death 
of irrelevance due to its own autonomous desires. Covalently, 
protestors cannot expect the university to address these issues if 
they do not respect the university’s historical-cultural situation 
7 As an American born in The South who has had to live with the legacy 
of Jim Crow as the next embodiment of freedom after slavery for black 
men and women, this is something I recognize well. Perhaps South 
Africans do too within the history/legacy of apartheid.
– research and education is the hard boring of hard boards and 
the university cannot capitulate to the immediate changes of 
the times. Doing so negates the thoughtful processes and goals 
embedded within the university’s mission. 
With regard to the language debate and the larger issue of racial 
transformation within the university system, this means that 
academics must seek to understand the concerns governing 
the changes within society. Is the language debate similar to 
Leuven’s? Definitely not, given the distinct histories of Belgium 
and South Africa, but South Africans should definitely not hope 
for the same outcome. Therefore, South African universities 
must not use their academic freedom to combat societal changes 
seen in ‘Afrikaans must fall’ and so forth, it must seek to uncover 
what is really going on: do people really detest Afrikaans or has 
it come to represent an undercurrent of historical injustice and 
neglect? If the latter, then universities must tangibly respond 
to those afflicted through systemic changes. However, merely 
accommodating society through changing official languages 
only meets Hegel’s definition of freedom; it does nothing to 
satisfy the underlying cries and anguish behind the protests. 
It must do more – it must unfold the concept of freedom 
once again – in service of the community with which it is 
entwined through evaluation, critique, and education. In this 
way, academic freedom does not entail autonomy. It requires 
something more, perhaps even a new concept of freedom that 
does not disintegrate into an individual will-to-power. This 
unfolding can either move toward the university breaking apart 
from society, or it can collectively pool its resources by pulling 
academia and society even closer together.
I envision that engaging society on the question of freedom – 
academic or otherwise – will resultantly become an engagement 
with how individuals, collectives, and, on an international 
level, how states perceive their own independence from their 
respective others and, accordingly, their obligations. The Brexit 
issue, upholding the European Union (or even multi-national 
treaties such as NATO), and the US religious freedom debates 
are pertinent pressure points that essentially question how 
one conceives of one’s own freedom and, by extension, via 
Hegel, how one conceives of self-determination. The academic 
community is already researching these questions but, at times, 
it fails to see that its own grappling with academic freedom is 
connected to these concerns. If academics were to merely exert 
their own autonomy, in the name of ‘solving’ these social issues, 
then is it not already making a political statement before it even 
presents its research? By claiming such autonomy, academics 
have already made a stand on the concept of freedom itself. 
Hypothetically, if a professor teaches and publishes that 
society needs to be further engaged with others, to become a 
tighter ‘we’ in solidarity, then he or she has essentially carved 
an exceptional space for themselves. Understanding that the 
question of academic freedom pertains to the larger concept of 
what freedom is to society is an essential, but often forgotten, 
step.
What I have carved out above is a critique of Hegelian freedom 
and its underpinning of the basic concept of freedom for 
both the Western and South African societies. I also localized 
the investigation by looking at academic freedom within 
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the South African university system. What I have not done 
is propose any remedies for the essential problematic that 
Hegel conceptualizes freedom as beginning with property and, 
hence, beginning with self-interest. I have intentionally left this 
question open-ended because I foresee a larger and perpetual 
conversation between academics and society concerning 
what our so-called independence from others actually means. 
However, as one can see within my critique, I find that the 
primary movement will be toward more engagement between 
others, not more autonomy from others. One could perhaps 
see the seeds of a discussion between Levinas, Habermas, 
Kierkegaard and others who explore intersubjectivity and its 
relationship to autonomy and obligation, and ultimately to 
ethics. Freedom, in this vein, becomes not just an ethical act but 
a political one. I anticipate a great, but heated and enduring, 
discussion.
On a concluding yet open-ended note, one might object that 
South African society is not solely defined by Hegelian freedom. 
This is certainly a fair objection. But, just before entering the 
Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg, I was instantly confronted 
with seven obelisks that represented the “seven fundamental 
values” or pillars of the new (1996) South African constitution: 
democracy, equality, reconciliation, diversity, responsibility, 
respect, and freedom (The Apartheid Museum, 2016). I cannot 
help but see Hegel’s influence within the final pillars of 
responsibility, respect, and freedom, especially after looking 
at the constitution itself. This is anecdotal, to be sure, but this 
monument is a monument for a reason: it is a testament of South 
Africa’s present and hopeful future just before one enters into 
its past throughout the museum. By adding four more pillars 
to the Hegelian three – democracy, equality, reconciliation and 
diversity – South Africa has already begun to see the issue with 
beginning understanding itself through mere responsibility, 
respect, freedom and so forth. Perhaps this acknowledgement 
of their forward-looking present, before regarding its past, is 
why this country is poised to question the nature of freedom 
once again from both a local and global perspective.
5. DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING 
INTERESTS
The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with 
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article.
6. FUNDING
The author received no financial support for the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Apartheid Museum.  2016.  The pillars of the constitution. http://www.apart-
heidmuseum.org/pillars-constitution   Date of Access: 29 Aug. 2016
Hegel, G.W.F.  2008.  Outlines of the philosophy of right. Trans. and Ed. by Stephen 
Houlgate.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Houlgate, S.  1991.  Freedom, truth and history.  London: Routledge.
Pippin, R.  2012.  Hegel on self-consciousness: Desire and death in the phenome-
nology of the spirit.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sands, J.  2016.  Hegelians in Heaven … But on Earth? Westphal’s Kierkegaardian 
Faith.  Journal for the History of Modern Theology, 23(1), 1-26.
South Africa.  1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
Taylor, C.  2005.  Hegel.  17th ed.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Westphal, M.  1992.  Hegel, freedom, and modernity.  Albany: SUNY Press.
